Monday, November 29, 2010
Tuesday, November 23, 2010
No, not Kashmir again | Deccan Chronicle | 2010-11-14
Kashmir has become a boring subject because it is the same story day after day: Hartals, stone-pelting, police firings a few killed. It is no longer front-page news in any paper. Recently, a few new items attracted media attention. The first was Arundhati Roy’s unprovoked statement that Kashmir was never a part of India. It was promptly followed by a well-planned protest outside her home by the ladies-wing of the BJP with TV cameramen on the ready for the show. The other was about the government-appointed interlocutors’ visit to Srinagar and neighbouring towns to enlighten us of what is going on and make suggestions about how to improve matters.
Everyone will agree that Arundhati Roy had every right to say what she wanted without anyone questioning her right to freedom to speech. However, she should have specified that she was only referring to the Valley of the Jhelum and not the whole of Kashmir. I have yet to hear a Kashmiri Muslim describe himself as an Indian — It is always “I am Kashmiri”. People often forget that Kashmir is not one, but three zones divided by race, religion, language and perception of the future. While the Valley is over 90 per cent Muslim and Kashmiri-speaking, Jammu is majority Hindu, speaking Hindustani, and Ladakh is majority Buddhists with a language of their own. Jammu and Ladakh consider themselves as an integral part of India and want no change. The problem is confined to the Valley where the people demand Special Status as was promised in 1947 when the state under Sheikh Abdullah acceded to secular India led by Pandit Nehru rather than to Islamic Pakistan led by Jinnah. That undertaking remains unfulfilled by India. CM Omar Abdullah is right in holding that Kashmir acceded to India in 1947 and not merge in it. Let him now spell out in detail what he wants to fulfil the promise Nehru made to his grandfather. I for one have complete faith in Omar’s ability and integrity.
I believe that Kashmiris have no option but to stay with India. The Jhelum Valley is too small and land-locked to be independent. It is dependent on India for its livelihood. Most of the tourists who holiday there are Indians. It sells its fruit, saffron to India. So also is handicrafts like shawls, papier mache products. Thousands of Kashmiris live in India and have emporiums to market their produce. Kashmiris have to ensure that no Hindus or Sikhs are compelled to leave the Valley as the Pandits have been. We cannot afford to have another exchange of populations as we had in 1947. That would be disastrous.
Interlocutors! Who are they and what are they meant to do? The dictionary says they are persons who take part in a dialogue. The trio are certainly an able lot and will give us a readable report: But to what purpose? To me they appear as ploy created by our home minister to create an impression that he is trying to resolve the Kashmir problem. It is an eye-wash.
Sedition
Freedom comes with restraint
So we angrily paint
Free-speech without our permission
As heinous sedition
In Srinagar, the separatists say
Whatever they may
But in Delhi, if they utter a word
Which has been so often heard
And never been found absurd,
It is fit case for sedition
Because it can break the nation
It is indeed a tribute to our democracy
That it finds it so risky
To tolerate dissent,
Motivated or well-meant,
Because like a cream cake
Which can so easily break
The unity of the country is at stake.
(Contributed by Kuldip Salil, New Delhi)
Falsetto
Santa was very proud of his voice and loved singing. On Diwali night he invited his friends for drinking and hear him sing. When everyone was lit up, he stood up to sing the latest hit from Bollywood. As he struck a high note, his upper denture fell out. He put it back in his mouth. When he struck a low note, his lower denture fell out. He put it back. While he was thinking how to strike the right note, one of his friends shouted: “O Santia, will you sing something or just keep changing cassettes?”
(Contributed by Harjeet Charanjit Singh, New Delhi)
Monday, November 22, 2010
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
Govt moots retail sector watchdog
Govt moots retail sector watchdog
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/govt-moots-retail-sector-watchdog/399959/
The Centre is mulling over creation of an independent body to regulate
the country’s vast retail sector. The retail regulatory authority would
ensure a level playing field for indigenous retail traders if the
government opens the sector to more foreign participation. The Ministry
of Consumer Affairs and Food has convened a meeting on July 8 in Delhi
to discuss this and other proposals and chart a comprehensive plan for
the sector, according to the agenda paper of the meeting.
The move is being seen as a precursor to opening the retail sector.
At present, India does not allow foreign investment in multi-brand
retail, while up to 51 per cent is allowed in single brand retail.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) of up to 100 per cent is allowed in
wholesale cash-and-carry trade. The ministry has invited, among others,
representatives from the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion
for the July meeting.
The meeting is also likely to take up for discussion a proposal to enact
a National Shopping Mall Regulation Act.
The need for a model legislation has been felt to prevent large domestic
retailers from displacing neighbourhood kirana stores, a sensitive issue
in India, where the retail market has been dominated by unorganised
retailers. It is proposed that environmental and urban laws be strictly
enforced to limit multiplication of malls and corporate retailers in a
particular area. It is also suggested that licences for opening shopping
malls be linked to the density of population and the stage of existing
competition in retail in the zone.
The meeting will also discuss whether there is a need to set up a
national commission to study the problems of the retail sector.
The Department of Consumer Affairs has suggested a two-stage discussion
on the retail sector, one at the level of the state governments on the
recommendations made by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Commerce. At another level, the department has proposed to hold talks
with academicians, non-governmental organisation, and others on opening
the retail sector.
With pressure building on the government to further open the sector for
foreign investment, the commerce and industry ministry had prepared a
concept note a few months ago to allow up to 51 per cent FDI in
multi-brand retail other than primary goods (foods, groceries and
vegetables), but with some stiff riders.
The note was prepared to generate a debate among key government
ministries which are involved in a re-look of the retail sector as well
as the FDI policy.
The commerce ministry was also keen to permit FDI in retail of foodgrain
as well as other essential commodities to create a parallel network to
the public distribution system, which has become notorious for its leakages.
The core of the plan is to allow FDI in retail, provided the retail
stores are located in cities with a minimum population of one million.
The move aims to protect vendors in small cities.
The ministry had also suggested minimum capitalisation norms for
companies investing in retail, in addition to a minimum built-up area
rule for their retail outlets.
Since 2006, when FDI was partially allowed in retail, the government has
approved 54 FDI proposals in the sector and the country has received an
inflow of Rs 822.70 crore.
With 15 million outlets, India’s retail sector is highly fragmented.
Only 4 per cent of the outlets are bigger than 500 square feet in area
and the remaining 96 per cent are in the unorgainsed sector.
There have been fears that with a liberal FDI regime, the big global
retailers would go in for predatory pricing, virtually destroying the
small retailers. That is the reason why the government has treaded
cautiously in this sector.
Companies such as Wal-Mart, Tesco and Carrefour, some of whom are
already in cash-and-carry business, have been trying to convince the
government to allow them access to India’s retail sector.
However, there is a growing view that FDI, in addition to bringing in
large investments, would also help in reducing costs, create new
employment opportunities, and improve conditions for small manufacturers
and retailers. And, the advantage of proximity to the consumer and
familiarity would ensure that small retailers co-exist with the big boys.
Churchill’s Dark Side: Six Questions for Madhusree Mukerjee—By Scott Horton (Harper's Magazine)
Churchill’s Dark Side: Six Questions for Madhusree Mukerjee
By Scott Horton
Madhusree Mukerjee, a former editor at Scientific American and the recipient of a Guggenheim fellowship, has published a bombshell book about Churchill’s attitudes toward India and the steps that he took during World War II that contributed to a horrific famine in Bengal in 1943. I put six questions to her about her book and some of the pushback it has drawn from Churchill’s defenders:
1. You write that Hitler never fully embraced the Indian nationalist cause because he expected Britain to reach some accommodation with Germany that allowed it to retain most of its empire, and specifically India. What is it about Churchill and Britain that Hitler misunderstood in this regard?
Hitler believed that the so-called Nordic race, which in his view included Germans and Britons, was destined to rule the world. He sought to emulate, not supplant, the British Empire: the German empire would comprise the Slavic countries to the east. As he saw it, the United Kingdom would retain its colonies but assume the role of Germany’s junior partner in world domination.
Hitler underestimated the depth of Churchill’s reverence for England’s imperial traditions. To Churchill, the British would be second to none. Moreover, Churchill’s reading of history told him that Britain had always maintained the balance of power in Europe: whenever France or Germany had marched, England had marched—against. This time would be no different. Churchill also believed that it was his destiny to lead his country in war against a vile enemy.
Hitler may have evoked particular repugnance because, in addition to persecuting Jews, he was seeking to enslave Europeans. Churchill had condoned the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, explaining that the aggressor was “an ancient State, with the highest sense of national honour and patriotism and with a teeming population and a remarkable energy.” And he had advised against intervention when Italy attacked Abyssinia, on the grounds that the victim was not “a fit, worthy, and equal member” of the League of Nations. Hitler trusted that British leaders would likewise comprehend his desire to induct Slavs, whom he saw simply as slaves, into the Third Reich.
2. Yet you do write that Churchill harbored a deep racism or at least ethnocentrism when it came to the Indians and that he toyed with the idea of building a British alliance with Untouchables, Sikhs, and Muslims to hold India and keep Hindu nationalists at bay. Did this reflect a reasonable appreciation of the forces then at work in India?
Perhaps at no other period during the war than in the summer and fall of 1943 did the number of ships at hand so greatly exceed those already committed to Allied operations… [in May] alone the president had transferred to British control fifteen to twenty cargo vessels for the duration of the war. By the summer of 1943, the British shipping crisis had given way to what historian Kevin Smith calls a “shipping glut” and the S branch would refer to as “[w]indfall shipping.”… So many vessels would present at North American ports that autumn to be loaded with supplies to add to the United Kingdom’s stockpile that not enough cargo could be found to fill them. If ever during the war a window had opened for saving lives in Bengal—at no discernible cost to the war effort—this was it.
—From Churchill’s Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India During World War II
Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Basic Books—Copyright © 2010 Madhusree Mukerjee
Churchill’s divide-and-rule policies found fertile ground among India’s Muslims. For decades, British conservatives had sought to deepen India’s inherent fissures in order to weaken the nascent independence movement. For instance, in 1905 Viceroy Curzon planned to partition Bengal province along religious lines, so as to enhance rivalries between Muslim landowners in its east and Hindu nationalists in its west. He also encouraged the formation of the Muslim League as a counterweight to the dominant nationalist party, the Indian National Congress.
A prolonged agitation led to Bengal being partitioned instead along linguistic lines. But then the colonial government introduced separate electorates for Muslims—that is, every Muslim in British India was required to vote for a Muslim. The measure favored separatists, who could get elected by appealing to narrow sectarian sentiments. The British subsequently introduced separate electorates for other groups as well, but the effort was partially repulsed.
So although Churchill was interested in exploiting diverse social fault lines, he concentrated on widening the Hindu-Muslim rift—which he regarded as “the bulwark of British rule in India.” When Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, called for a separate nation of Pakistan, Churchill hailed “the awakening of a new spirit of self-reliance and self-assertiveness” among India’s minorities. During the war, the British government encouraged the demand for Pakistan and propagandized along Islamist lines against Hindus.
3. At several points you suggest that Churchill was inspired by the remembrance of the 1857 uprising to take steps that disregarded the value of civilian lives in India. But, as you note, in 1920, following the Amritsar massacre, Churchill denounced precisely that logic when it was used by Brigadier Reginald Dyer and his supporters to justify the tragedy that had occurred. Churchill decried what happened as “frightfulness” and called for accountability for Dyer. Doesn’t this suggest a different attitude towards the Indians?
In 1920 Churchill was not hostile to Indians. The independence movement had yet to develop to its full strength; and the Indian Army, which was largely loyal to the British, had just sacrificed 60,000 lives in World War I. The British Empire was threatened mainly by actions such as Dyer’s. By killing more than a thousand Sikh civilians—at least by the Indian account—Dyer had undermined the loyalty of Sikh soldiers in the Indian Army. The army had accordingly dismissed Dyer; and, as secretary of state for war, Churchill was called upon to defend the army’s action. Hence his speech denouncing “frightfulness,” or terror tactics.
Incidentally, in these years Churchill was calling for gas attacks on rebellious Iraqis, in order to “spread a lively terror.”
By the 1940s, the Indian situation had changed dramatically. The freedom movement, led by Gandhi, posed a potent challenge to the Empire and caused Churchill’s animosity toward Indians to escalate. And the Indian Army had acquired many native officers, whose loyalty could not be taken for granted. So Churchill ensured that if rebellion broke out in India, the colony’s best-equipped and -trained battalions would be fighting the Axis—on another continent.
India was bereft of defenses, so that when Japanese forces reached the colony’s borders, the War Cabinet ordered scorched-earth measures to deter their advance. The resulting destruction of rice and boats contributed to famine.
4. The central thesis in your book is that Churchill and the War Cabinet took a series of decisions which led inexorably to the starvation of between 1.5 and 3 million persons in 1943. You do not, however, charge that it was their conscious intention to starve these people to death—unlike what the Nazis did in east central Europe about this same time, when starvation was a conscious policy objective. But do you believe that they knew or should have known that this catastrophe would follow from their decisions?
The War Cabinet received repeated warnings that famine could result from its exhaustive use of Indian resources for the war effort—and ignored them.
The Japanese occupation of Burma in March 1942 cut off rice imports, of between one and two million tons per year, to India. Instead of protecting the Indian public from the resultant food shortage, the War Cabinet insisted that India absorb this loss and, further, export rice to countries that could no longer get it from South East Asia. As a result, after war arrived at India’s borders, the colony exported 260,000 tons of rice in the fiscal year 1942-43.
Meanwhile India’s war expenditures increased ten fold, and the government printed paper money to pay for them. In August 1942 a representative of India’s viceroy told the War Cabinet that runaway inflation could lead to “famines and riots.”
In December 1942, Viceroy Linlithgow warned that India’s grain supply was seriously short and he urgently needed 600,000 tons of wheat to feed soldiers and the most essential industrial workers. The War Cabinet stated that ships were not available. In January 1943, Churchill moved most of the merchant ships operating in the Indian Ocean over to the Atlantic, in order to build up the United Kingdom’s stockpile of food and raw materials. The Ministry of War Transport cautioned him that the shift would result in “violent changes and perhaps cataclysms” in trade around the Indian Ocean. (In addition to India, the colonies of Kenya, Tanganyika, and British Somaliland all suffered famine in 1943.) Although refusing to meet India’s need for wheat, Churchill insisted that India continue to export rice.
With famine raging, in July 1943 Viceroy Linlithgow halted rice exports and again asked the War Cabinet for wheat imports, this time of 500,000 tons. That was the minimum required to feed the army and otherwise maintain the war effort. The news of impending shipments would indirectly ease the famine, he noted: any hoarders would anticipate a fall in prices and release grain, causing prices to fall in reality. But at a meeting on August 4, the War Cabinet failed to schedule even a single shipment of wheat for India. Instead, it ordered the buildup of a stockpile of wheat for feeding European civilians after they had been liberated. So 170,000 tons of Australian wheat bypassed starving India—destined not for consumption but for storage.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom’s stockpile of food and raw materials, intended for shoring up the postwar British economy, reached 18.5 million tons, the highest ever. Sugar and oilseeds overflowed warehouses and had to be stored outdoors, under tarpaulins.
Of course Churchill knew that his priorities would result in mass death. In one of his tirades against Indians, he said they were “breeding like rabbits” anyway. On behalf of Indians, the War Cabinet ignored an offer of 100,000 tons of Burmese rice from freedom fighter Subhas Chandra Bose (who was allied with the Japanese), discouraged a gift of wheat from Canada, and turned down rice and wheat volunteered by the United States.
The War Cabinet eventually ordered for India 80,000 tons of wheat and 130,000 tons of barley. (Barley was useless for famine relief because it had no impact on prices.) The first of these meager shipments reached India in November. All the while, the Indian Army consumed local rice and wheat that might otherwise have fed the starving. The famine came to an end in December 1943, when Bengal harvested its own rice crop—at which point Churchill and his friend Cherwell renewed their demand for rice exports.
5. Another figure who comes in for a shellacking in your book is Frederick Alexander Lindemann, later Lord Cherwell, an Anglo-German known as “the Prof,” who exercised a powerful influence over Churchill. You describe Cherwell as an impressive scientist but also someone who harbored some rather sinister Malthusian ideas with a latent racist component. What were these ideas and how did they contribute to the famine?
All the evidence points to the prime minister and his closest adviser having believed that Indians were ordained to reside at the bottom of the social pyramid, such that their financial ascendancy as creditors during the war became a source of frustration and fury. Long after India had obtained independence, the Prof would describe the “abdication of the white man” as the worst calamity of the twentieth century—more deplorable than two world wars and the Holocaust.
—From Churchill’s Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India During World War II
Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Basic Books—Copyright © 2010 Madhusree Mukerjee
Judging by a lecture that Cherwell gave in the 1930s, he regarded colonial subjects as “helots,” or slaves, whose only reason for existence was the service of racial superiors. In drafts of this talk, he outlined how science could help entrench the hegemony of the higher races. By means of hormones, drugs, mind control, and surgery, one could remove from slaves the ability to suffer or to feel ambition—yielding humans with “the mental make-up of the worker bee.” Such a lobotomized race would have no thought of rebellion or votes, so that one would end up with a perfectly peaceable and permanent society, “led by supermen and served by helots.”
In November 1943, Cherwell urged Churchill to hold firm against demands for famine relief. Else, he warned, “so long as the war lasts [India’s] high birthrate may impose a heavy strain on this country which does not view with Asiatic detachment the pressure of a growing population on limited supplies of food.” That is, he blamed the famine on the irresponsible fecundity of natives—and ignored the devastation of the Indian economy by the war effort. He also elided the fact that the War Cabinet was preventing India from using its ample sterling balance or even its own ships to import sufficient wheat.
By Cherwell’s Malthusian argument, England should have been the first to starve. It was being kept alive by massive imports. In 1943 the United Kingdom imported 4 million tons of wheat, 1.6 million tons of meat, 1.4 million tons of sugar, 409,000 heads of live cattle, 325,000 tons of fish, 131,000 tons of rice, 206,000 tons of tea, 172,000 tons of cocoa, and 1.1 million gallons of wine for its 47.7 million people—a population an eighth that of India.
To Cherwell and also to Churchill, colonial subjects were worth saving only if they made a direct contribution to the war effort. According to Field Marshal Wavell, Churchill wanted to feed only those Indians who were “actually fighting or making munitions or working some particular railways.” The rest were dispensable.
6. Arthur Herman argues that you rely too heavily on Leo Amery’s diaries, recording Churchill’s intemperate outbursts, and pass by the fact that Churchill took decisive steps to ameliorate the famine. “Without Churchill,” he says, “the famine would have been worse.” How do you respond to this?
My indictment is based on what Churchill did, not on what he said. The Ministry of War Transport papers, the Cherwell Papers, and the official histories of British wartime food supply, shipping, and economy are my key sources. They show, for instance, that the War Cabinet scheduled eighteen ships to load with Australian wheat in September and October, 1943. Not one of these ships was destined for famine-stricken India.
Had anyone else been prime minister, he would have striven to relieve India’s plight instead of consigning wheat to stockpiles.
Churchill’s diatribes, as recorded in Amery’s and others’ diaries, are, however, useful in understanding why he acted as he did. Famine had failed to temper his hostility toward Indians. Churchill would tell his secretary that Hindus were a foul race protected by their rapid breeding from “the doom that is their due.” He wished Arthur Harris, the head of British bomber command, could “send some of his surplus bombers to destroy them.”
Saturday, November 13, 2010
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